Firestorm
These are some of the undisputed facts that SDG&E does not want you to know
Without Our Immediate Action we will soon have “Renewable” Firestorms in San Diego, compliments of corporate greed
Supervisor Dianne Jacob Testimony before the CPUC
Quoting from a press release from Supervisor Jacob
“It is my very strong belief that what SDG&E is asking you to approve is the equivalent of walking into our fire prone backcountry during Santa Ana wind conditions, striking a match and throwing it on the ground,” Jacob told commissioners. “SDG&E wants you to gamble with human life. Please don’t.”
Jacob also took issue with the computer modeling described in the report.
“The report’s computer modeling used 50 miles per hour winds to simulate extreme conditions. Santa Anas can be twice that,” she said.
Jacob has been a strong supporter for San Diego, including east county, during these hearings.
The Final EIR warns of fire dangers that can not be mitigated
The following is taken directly from the final EIR http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/environment/info/aspen/sunrise/feir/D15%20Fire.pdf and clearly predicts that a catastrophic fire is predictable if this project is built.
The EIR states, “San Diego County is an extremely fire-prone landscape. Winds originating from the Great Basin, locally known as Santa Anas, create extreme fire weather conditions characterized by low humidity, sustained high-speed winds, and extremely strong gusts. Santa Ana winds typically blow from the northeast over the Peninsular Range. As the air is forced through coastal mountain passes, wind speeds of 40 mph can be maintained for hours with gusts from 70 to 115 mph possible (Schroeder et al., 1964). Santa Ana winds create extremely dangerous fire conditions and have been the primary driver of most of California’s catastrophic wildfires. Because of the presence of dense, dry fuels and periodic Santa Ana winds, southern California has been characterized as having one of the most fire-prone landscapes in the world.
15.2.2 Fire Suppression and Firefighting
Wildland firefighters working around energized power lines are exposed to electrical shock hazards including: direct contact with downed power lines, contact with electrically charged materials and equipment due to broken lines, contact with smoke that can conduct electricity between lines, and the use of solid-stream water applications around energized lines. Between 1980 and 1999 in the U.S., there were 10 firefighter fatalities due to electrical structure contact during wildfire suppression (NFPA, 2001). Maintaining a minimum 500-foot safety buffer greatly reduces the risk of electrical structure contact, and it also reduces the effectiveness of ground-based frontal attacks.
Impact F-3: Presence of the overhead transmission line would reduce the effectiveness of firefighting (Class I)
Aerial and ground-based firefighting efforts would be compromised by the introduction of an overhead transmission line due to the introduction of various hazards as identified in the Containment Conflict Model results, including increasing the risk of transmission line contact by aircraft or water buckets, creating indefensible landscapes, and obstructing historical fire containment boundaries.
The outcome of not fighting a wildfire in an otherwise defensible landscape under favorable weather conditions is that it is able to build in size and intensity unchecked by firefighters who are forced to wait until the fire passes through the area. Delays in containment allow for rapid fire perimeter growth. With the increase in the fire perimeter comes the potential for wind-blown embers to ignite spot fires ahead of the fire front, which further complicates fire suppression activities.
Impact F-2: Presence of the overhead transmission line would increase the probability of a wildfire (Class I)
The presence of the overhead transmission line would create an ongoing source of potential wildfire ignitions for the life of the project. Line faults can be caused by such unpredictable events as conductor contact by floating debris, gun shots, and helicopter collisions; these events are rare but would be unavoidable.
Impact F-2 is considered a significant impact because certain ignition sources are unavoidable. Due to the potential for unavoidable ignitions related to the presence of the overhead transmission line to occur during extreme fire weather, the presence of the project would significantly increase the likelihood of a catastrophic wildfire (Class I). The risk of ignitions and the risk of damage from a project-related ignition can be reduced, though not to a level that is less than significant.
Impact F-3: Presence of the overhead transmission line would reduce the effectiveness of firefighting. (Class I)
Aerial and ground-based firefighting efforts would be compromised by the introduction of an overhead transmission line due to 
the introduction of various hazards as identified in the Containment Conflict Model results, including increasing the risk of transmission line contact by aircraft or water buckets, creating indefensible landscapes, and obstructing historical fire containment boundaries.
The outcome of not fighting a wildfire in an otherwise defensible landscape under favorable weather conditions is that it is able to build in size and intensity unchecked by firefighters who are forced to wait until the fire passes through the area. Delays in containment allow for rapid fire perimeter growth. With the increase in the fire perimeter comes the potential for wind-blown embers to ignite spot fires ahead of the fire front, which further complicates fire suppression activities.”
Read the full report for more shocking revelations of what the CPUC thinks is acceptable, while at the same time we are warned that the state is running out of money to fight our fires. To me, this seems at best irresponsible, and at worst, criminal.
Lakeside Fire Chief Mark Baker concerned about Fire Mitigation in the Project
At a February 18, 2009 Lakeside Planning Group meeting, Fire Chief Baker stated concern and asked why his department was not contacted for input on fire mitigation for the project. He stated that planes are impeded from fighting fires with towers and lines in place, and he wanted to know what fire mitigation was planned. Click here to see the Lakeside Planning group minutes from the February 18, 2009 meeting.
At a February 18, 2009 Lakeside Planning Group meeting, Fire Chief Baker stated concern and asked why his department was not contacted for input on fire mitigation for the project. He stated that planes are impeded from fighting fires with towers and lines in place, and he wanted to know what fire mitigation was planned. Click here to see the Lakeside Planning group minutes from the February 18, 2009 meeting.